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THE INTENT ELEMENT OF INDUCED
INFRINGEMENT
Timothy R. Holbrookt
I. INTRODUCTION
The expectation when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. I was that the Court would explore
the contours of its decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.2 And in fact the Court did just that, but not in the manner most
expected or hoped. To the surprise of many - and consternation of
some - the Court imported 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) active inducement
from patent law into copyright law 3 just as it had imported 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (c) contributory infringement in Sony.4
In so doing, the Court avoided addressing the language in Sony
that precluded contributory copyright infringement for devices that
are "capable of substantial noninfringing uses."' 5  This judicial-
sidestepping has interesting implications for active inducement law,
now both in patent and copyright law. Particularly, the Supreme
Court's concern with the seemingly nefarious intent of Grokster
highlights the important and uncertain role of intent in assessing
infringement under section 271 (b).
f Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. My thanks to Santa Clara
University Law School and particularly the High Tech Law Institute for sponsoring this
fascinating conference on third-party liability and allowing me to comment on Professor Charles
W. Adams informative article. Special thanks to Namon Huddleston for assistance with
preparation of this article. © 2005 Timothy R. Holbrook
1. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
2. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
3. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 ("For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-
article doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule,
too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it here .....
4. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439-42.
5. Id. at 442.
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Part I of this essay discusses the intent standard and articulates
what the proper standard should be - an intent to induce infringement.
Part II provides a brief summary of indirect infringement in patent
law under sections 271(b) and (c), followed by a summary of the
Grokster. Part III explains the current split in authority at the Federal
Circuit and explores the substantive differences between the two
standards. The Essay posits that the proper standard should require
that the inducer have an intent to induce infringement, not merely
intent to induce acts that constitute infringement. The potential
anticompetitive consequences of the broader rule and the risk of
punishing innocent actors under an exceptional form of liability both
commend the more exacting intent standard. Moreover, as
overlooked in previous commentary, use of the narrower standard
would only insulate the inducer from past liability; it would not
protect the infringer from prospective relief, particularly a permanent
injunction.
II. GROKSTER'S IMPORTATION OF PATENT'S "INDUCEMENT" THIRD-
PARTY LIABILITY INTO COPYRIGHT LAW
In order to assess the implications of the Supreme Court's
importation of active inducement into patent law, a summary of the
doctrinal features - and ambiguities - of active inducement is
necessary. This review demonstrates that active inducement may not
provide the clear answers that the Court believed it would.
A. A Summary of Indirect Infringement in Patent Law
Liability for active inducement of infringement and contributory
infringement are variations of third-party liability, where one party is
held liable for the directly infringing acts of others. The justifications
for these rules are the same as those used to rationalize joint and
several liability elsewhere in tort law: difficulty in suing the direct
infringers because of their large numbers, their dispersed nature, their
status as the patentee's customer, or their inability to compensate the
patentee. 6 Also, the indirect infringer may be more morally culpable
6. See, e.g., Michael N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe: Why
the Federal Circuit Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271(b), 10
FED. CIR. BAR J. 299, 300 (2000); see also Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One's
Customers and The Dilemma Of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOzO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 725 (2005).
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than the direct infringers. 7 Indeed, the inducers may be considerably
more culpable in the patent infringement context because direct
infringement is a strict liability offense. 8
In patent law, the rules for third-party liability have been
codified. 9  Section 271(b) proscribes the "active inducement" of
patent infringement. While ambiguous, Congress intended this
provision to be a codification of the common law that had developed
up to this point.' 0 Congress also enacted a narrower version of
indirect infringement, labeled contributory infringement in section
271(c). A party is liable as an infringer if she supplies a component
of a patented device "knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninflinging use."'11
In contrast, copyright law has permitted third party liability but
not through statutory grants of authority or codification; instead, the
law has developed pursuant to common law. 12 In order to facilitate
the development of third-party liability in copyright law, the Supreme
Court adopted the contributory infringement standard of section
271(c) in Sony, providing liability for the sale of a good that has no
other substantial use but to infringe. 13  There is no indirect
infringement if the device is "capable of substantial noninfringing
7. Id.
8. This may be one reason why third party liability in copyright and patent law might
differ. Direct infringers infringe a patent even if they independently create the invention. In
contrast, direct copyright infringers must actually copy the work, rendering them "less innocent"
than some patent infringers.
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) & (c) (2005). Some courts have concluded that the Copyright
Act codified indirect liability theories in the language prohibiting parties from "authorizing" the
copying of works by others. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005); Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe
Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Not all courts and
commentators agree with this view and treat the authorization right as a second variant of direct
infringement. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement
for Offering in the United States to Sell an Invention Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 701, 735-
38, 739-41 (2004). Regardless, copyright law does not have the express codification present in
patent law, particularly as it relates to contributor infringement under § 271 (c).
10. See Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement,
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 370 (2006).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2005).
12. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2776 (2005).
13. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441 (1984).
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uses." 14 The lower courts struggled with this in Grokster,15 but the
Supreme Court had other ideas.
B. The Supreme Court's View of Indirect Infringement in
Grokster
Most observers believed that the Supreme Court would use
Grokster as a vehicle to reassess the scope and continued viability of
its reasoning in Sony. The Court did implicitly reaffirm the analysis
of Sony but failed to further clarify it, opting instead to embrace a
theory of active inducement in copyright law. The Court reasoned
that the staple article of commerce concept in section 271(c) is simply
a method used to impute intent of the relevant infringer to facilitate
infringement by others. 16 The Court recognized, however, that Sony
does not comprise the universe of third-party liability in copyright
law: "nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if
there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose
rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law." 17  In
other words, contributory infringement under section 271(c) is merely
a particular type of third-party liability, but the concept itself is
broader and embraces efforts by actors to induce the infringement of
copyright by others. The Court concluded in Grokster:
We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
14. Id. at 442. The exact language of § 271(c) provides that a party is liable for
contributory infringement if they sell, offer to sell, or import "a component of a patented
machine" so long as the component is "not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfringing use." 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2005). Thus, § 271(c) relates only to
parts of devices, and not the devices as a whole, unlike the Supreme Court's application of the
test in Sony. This may explain the difficulty courts had in applying the "capable of substantial
noninfringing uses" test because they were assessing the non-infringing potential of an entire
device, and not merely a component. Under patent law, indirect liability for aspects of
providing the entirety of the device are covered by § 271 (b).
15. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1161-63 (9th
Cir. 2005).
16. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777 ("[W]here an article is 'good for nothing else' but
infringement, there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no
injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe." (quoting Canada v. Michigan
Malleable Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903)); see also Rader, supra note 6, at 305
("Contributory infringement was Congress's response to the problem of Wallace v. Holmes, in
which the intent of the defendant to infringe is manifest from the fact that the product sold has
no substantial non-infringing uses.").
17. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779.
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expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement,
is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.18
Thus, there can be third-party liability even if the copying device
is capable of substantial non-infringing uses. 19
The Court thereby avoided addressing the Sony issue and viewed
this suit as a clear case of active inducement. It is unclear, however,
whether the issue of non-infringing uses truly is irrelevant, even under
an inducement theory. The Court acknowledges that in order to be
liable, an inducer must commit certain acts with the requisite intent. 20
Most of the Court's reasoning, however, focuses on the intent
element; the Court afforded little time to the discussion of what acts
are sufficient to constitute active inducement.
The Supreme Court viewed the intent element in this case as a
slam dunk. The Court based its conclusion on a variety of facts.
First, the infringers (Grokster and StreamCast) aimed "to satisfy a
known source of demand for copyright infringement, the market
comprising former Napster users. ' 21  Second, neither company
attempted to filter, or even to develop filtering tools, to lessen
infringing activities. 22 Third, the business model used by the accused
infringers was to sell ads; the more use, the more money. As the
primary use was infringement, facilitating infringement was the best
way for these companies to make money.23 In light of all these
undisputed facts, the Court found that "[t]he unlawful objective is
unmistakable. 24
18. Id. at 2770.
19. Although it is curious as to whether the outcome in Sony would have been different
under the Grokster approach. The Court in Grokster stated that there was "no evidence of state
or indicated intent to promote infringing uses." Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777. Such reasoning is
an overstatement of what took place in Sony. There was other evidence, however, that Sony's
advertisements recommended creating libraries of a viewer's favorite shows. See Sony, 464
U.S. at 458-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Creation of libraries to allow multiple viewings of
the show appears to be outside the scope of the time-shifting analysis, suggesting that Sony
attempted to induce infringement by its customers.
20. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780 ("The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct .....
21. Id.at2781.
22. Id. at 2781. The Court made clear, however, that this fact alone would be insufficient
for there to be liability if the device was capable of non-infringing uses because "[s]uch a
holding would tread too close to the Sony safeharbor." Id. at 2781 n.12.
23. Id. at 2781-82. Of course, many on-line endeavors earn revenue through such
advertising, so likely - or perhaps hopefully - the Court would view this fact alone as
insufficient for finding the requisite intent.
24. Id. at 2782.
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The Court thoroughly evaluated whether the intent element of
inducement was satisfied, concluding that it was. Oddly, the Court
never expressly articulated the proper standard of intent. Indeed, and
perhaps unbeknownst to the Court, this precise issue has divided the
Federal Circuit.
1II. THE INTRACIRCUIT SPLIT ON INTENT AND THE NON-INFRINGING
USE PHOENIX
The law of active inducement, and particularly the intent
standard, is currently confused. As commentators 25 and the Federal
Circuit itself have recognized, 26 there is an intracircuit split about the
requisite intent. Specifically, the court has failed to clarify whether
an inducer must have an intent to induce the acts that constitute
infringement 27 or an intent to induce infringement. 28 To some, this
may seem simply to be lexicographical chicanery with no bearing on
outcomes. 29 There are substantive consequences that flow from these
varying standards.
A. The Differences between the Two Intent Standards
For patent law, the difference between these standards is
important because an accused inducer may believe the acts of the
direct infringers are outside the scope of the patent or that the patent
is invalid or unenforceable. Similarly, in copyright law, an accused
inducer may have a good faith belief that there are substantial non-
infringing uses or that the infringement by third-parties should
constitute fair use. Thus, notwithstanding the apparent hope of the
25. See Adams, supra note 10, at 391; Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39
UC DAVIS L. REV. 225, 238-39 (2005); Comment, District Court Holds That Inducement
Liability Requires Proof Of Intent To Induce Violation Of The Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1246
(2002); Rader, supra note 6, at 300.
26. See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted on other grounds, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005); MEMC
Elec. Mat'ls, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Mat'ls Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
27. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir.1990)
("Proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary
prerequisite to finding active inducement.").
28. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(requiring that inducer "knew or should have known his actions would induce actual
infringements.").
29. Insituform Techs., Inc., v. Cat. Contr., Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (2004) ( "[W]e need
not resolve any ambiguity in the case law on this point because there is sufficient evidence to
support the district court's finding under either standard.").
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Supreme Court to avoid the Sony issue, the non-infringing use
standard may arise from the ashes. The relevance of these facts to
inducement hinge entirely on the intent standard.
If the requisite intent is merely to cause the acts which constitute
infringement, the accused inducer's belief about infringement,
validity, or enforceability is irrelevant. The primary concern under
this standard is whether the inducer wanted the third parties to engage
in a certain activity. Her belief regarding whether third parties
actually are infringing is irrelevant because the wrong we are seeking
to redress is encouraging those acts. If those third party activities are
found not to be infringing, then there will be no liability for active
inducement: there must be a direct infringer for there to be indirect
liability. Of course, an intent to induce infringement would satisfy
this standard as well: an intent to induce infringement necessarily
would mean the inducer intended to induce the acts constituting
infringement. The "intent to induce the acts" standard consequently
encompasses a far broader category of actors than the narrower
"intent to induce infringement" approach.
In contrast, if the inducer must intend to induce infringement,
then the mental state of the infringer vis-A-vis the legality of the acts
becomes directly relevant. While the accused infringer may have
intended to induce others to perform certain acts, her belief that those
acts are non-infringing would insulate her from liability.30 She would
be viewed as insufficiently culpable for assessing liability. Her belief
could be rooted in the belief that the acts are outside the literal or
equivalent scope of the patent claims, the claims are invalid, or the
patent is unenforceable. 31 In the copyright context, such a belief may
be based on a belief that the extent of the copying is insufficient or
that the use is fair. 32
30. See Rader, supra note 6, at 315, 321.
31. See Lemley, supra note 25, at 240 n.70 (noting relevance of invalidity belief but also
fact that no district court has held as of yet).
32. The Federal Circuit has apparently missed this distinction. In an effort to reconcile the
Hewlett-Packard and Manville standards, the court stated that knowledge of the patent plus an
intent to induce the acts constituting infringement would permit a presumption of an intent to
induce infringement. MEMC Elec. Mat'ls, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Mat'Is Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d
1369, 1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005). It is unclear if the court is in fact creating a rebuttable
presumption or simply using "presumption" in a vernacular fashion. If the former, then likely
the presumption could be rebutted by demonstrating that the accused inducer believed the
patents were not infringed, invalid, or unenforceable. If the latter, then the court failed to
consider the role that the accused inducer's belief could have on liability.
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This version of intent would make active inducement akin to
willful infringement in patent law.33 If a party willfully infringes a
patent, a court may enhance the damages award up to treble
damages. 34 Willfulness is generally found when an infringer has
actual notice of the patent and chooses, nonetheless, to infringe.35
Willfulness can be negated if the patentee has a good faith belief that
she is not infringing or that the patent is invalid or unenforceable. 36
Traditionally, this belief is memorialized in an opinion letter from
counsel. As such, opinion letters may now become relevant to the
assessment of active inducement if the accused infringer must intend
to induce third party infringement.37 If an accused indirect infringer
can evince a good faith belief of non-infringement, then she should be
able to avoid liability.
The shield from liability would only be retrospective, however.
The indirect infringer should not be immunized from prospective
relief if her belief is later shown to be unfounded at trial. Previous
commentators have suggested that a good faith belief would act as a
complete defense. 38 However, there is no reason for this to be the
case. The accused infringer's belief will eventually be vindicated or
rejected at trial. If the accused infringer is correct that the acts of
third parties are not infringing or that the patent is invalid or
unenforceable, then she will be not be liable at all: there can only be
infringement for inducement if there are, in fact, direct infringers. 39
On the other hand, if her belief is shown to be incorrect at trial, there
is no reason to shield her from prospective relief. If she continues her
activities from that point forward, her acts would constitute active
inducement. Consequently, there is no reason to completely shield
her from prospective remedies, particularly a permanent injunction.
A good faith belief of noninfringement under this intent standard
would be similar to a laches defense. Laches is an equitable defense
33. Cf Rader, supra note 6, at 33 1.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2005); see also Read Corp. v. Portec Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
35. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2006) (draft on file with author).
36. See, e.g., Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 828.
37. Rader, supra note 6, at 315.
38. Id. at 330 ("First, enabling alleged inducers to escape liability by obtaining a
noninfringement opinion from counsel, as suggested in Manville Sales, would result in highly
uneven patent protection across different industries." (emphasis added)).
39. See, e.g., Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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to infringement where the patentee unreasonably and inexcusably
delays bringing suit and the alleged infringer suffers material
prejudice attributable to the delay.40 Unlike in other civil areas,
laches is not a complete defense to patent infringement; it only
precludes liability for pre-suit damages. 41  The infringer still is
subject to a permanent injunction, as well as damages that may accrue
after the lawsuit is filed.42 Similarly, the conclusion that a good faith
belief in non-infringement precludes pre-trial damages, but the
accused infringer remains subject to a permanent injunction if the
fact-finder determines that the accused inducer's belief is erroneous.
A party should not be permitted to continue to induce infringement
once their belief has been rejected by a court.
The differing standards of intent, therefore, have significant
implications. The "intent to induce the acts" standard is far broader
and risks liability for parties who genuinely believe they are not
running afoul of a patent. In contrast, the "intent to induce
infringement" standard provides a safe harbor for those who believe
their acts are not infringing, although this harbor only protects against
past damages and not prospective relief.
B. Does the Grokster Opinion Implicitly Provide the
Appropriate Intent Standard?
The Supreme Court in Grokster spilled a considerable amount of
ink discussing the "unlawful" intent of the accused infringers in this
case.43  The Court's analysis, however, does not expressly or
implicitly establish which intent standard is the correct one. The
factors relied upon by the Court suggest that it believed the
defendants possessed an intent to induce infringement, perhaps
supporting that standard. An intent to induce infringement, however,
necessarily satisfies a requirement for an intent to induce the acts
constituting infringement. 44 Thus, although the Court applied the
narrower standard, that application does not necessarily answer the
question.
40. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(en banc).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1040-41.
43. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
44. See supra Section III.A.
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C. Requiring an Intent to Induce Infringement is the Better
Standard
What then is the appropriate standard? In my view, the narrower
"intent to induce infringement" standard is appropriate.
The statutory structure of sections 271 (b) and (c) suggest that the
requirement should be an intent to induce infringement. As the
Supreme Court noted, intent in the contributory infringement context
is presumed by the absence of a non-infringing use of the good. The
focus is on infringing uses; the presumed intent under contributory
infringement is, therefore, that of inducing actual infringement, not
merely the acts that constitute infringement. 45 If the good has both
infringing and non-infringing uses, intent cannot be presumed. Of
course, because an intent to induce infringement necessarily satisfies
the broader standard articulated in Hewlett-Packard, this statutory
argument is not conclusive. It does demonstrate the narrow focus of
indirect liability under the statute and the reality that indirect
infringement liability should be exceptional. Using the broader intent
standard risks swallowing section 271(c) altogether. An intent to
induce any acts that might result in an infringement would fall under
section 271(b) even if there are considerable non-infringing uses.
Third-party liability should be the exception and not the rule.
While designed to allow patentees to seek recovery in circumstances
where it may be impractical to do so, the doctrine should not create a
windfall for patentees against innocent parties. There always are
direct infringers that the patentee could pursue, even if doing so is
impractical. Indirect liability should be reserved for parties who truly
are culpable.
Truly culpable parties are those that intend to induce
infringement and not those who simply intend to induce the acts that
constitute infringement. To hold otherwise would penalize a "good"
actor who holds a belief that the others are not directly infringing.
Such behavior is pro-competitive - it encourages parties to enter the
market if they have such a belief. Allowing these parties to enter the
market may create incentives to challenge otherwise potentially
invalid patents. The Hewlett-Packard standard would create a
chilling effect on competition because a party would be liable even if
45. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2777 (2005)
("The doctrine was devised to identify instances in which it may be presumed from distribution
of an article in commerce that the distributor intended the article to be used to infringe another's
patent, and so may justly be held liable for that infringement.").
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they viewed the patent as invalid or not infringed. The public would
pay the price in terms of reduced competition, potentially higher
prices, and even worse the existence of invalid patents. Challenging
such patents benefits the public by removing these burdensome
patents.
The narrower intent standard articulated in Manville would not
reduce the value of patents significantly. A good faith belief would
only guard against past liability and would not preclude prospective
relief against the inducer. While the patentee may not be able to
recoup past damages, she will be able to prevent the inducer from
inducing future infringement. Such prospective relief mitigates some
of the reduction in the value of the patent that attends the use of the
narrower standard. If the patentee sues in a timely fashion, then the
lost damages may not be terribly significant and the true strength of
the patent - preliminary and permanent injunctive relief- will remain
available. The threat of an injunction also facilitates settlement
negotiations, so the patentee will not lose all negotiation leverage.
In contrast to my position, a previous commentator has urged the
broader "intent to induce the acts" approach. In his view, use of this
standard better protects the patentees' rights in their inventions. The
use of opinion letters, according to Mr. Rader, would allow inducers
to insulate themselves from liability too easily.46 Moreover, the
relevance of opinion letters would blur the line between willful
infringement and active inducement. Maintaining this distinction is
particularly important, in his view, because a good faith belief in the
willfulness context only precludes the enhancement of damages and
not all damages as may be the case in the inducement context.47
Interestingly, as Professor Mark Lemley has questioned, potentially
every inducer under the narrower standard could ipso facto be a
willful infringer.48 Finally, in Mr. Rader's opinion, the Hewlett-
Packard standard "limits the opportunistic behavior of would-be
inducers by giving patentees the power to compel settlement by
forcing corporate officers to face the prospect of personal liability. '49
46. Rader, supra note 6, at 332 ("In a sense, obtaining an opinion of counsel regarding
inducement would serve largely the same purpose [as labels denouncing infringement]-
enabling a would-be inducer to forge ahead with the harmful activity, by having it rubber-
stamped by an outside law firm.").
47. But see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (demonstrating that a good faith
belief would only immunize infringers from past infringement and not prospective relief).
48. See Lemley, supra note 25, at 240 n.70; see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2005).
49. Rader, supra note 6, at 332.
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He, therefore, concludes that the broader "intent to induce the acts"
approach is better.
These arguments are not persuasive. They reflect an exceedingly
pro-patentee viewpoint and fail to consider the potential anti-
competitive consequences of affording such a powerful tool to patent
owners. To begin, there exists no inherent value in maintaining a
distinction between willfulness and inducement. The two doctrines
ultimately are trying to answer the same question: is this party one
who is morally culpable in some way? In the case of willfulness, the
answer informs whether and to what extent the court should enhance
damages as a form of punishment. 50 In the case of active inducement,
the answer tells us whether this party should be liable for the
infringing acts of others. That one is an enhancement and the other a
defense to past damages does not suggest a need to keep them
distinct. A finding of active inducement also will not mandate an
enhancement of damages. The law is clear that willfulness is a
necessary prerequisite for enhanced damages, but a finding of
willfulness does not mandate enhanced damages. 51 Consequently, an
active inducer will not automatically be subject to enhanced damages
as a willful infringer.
Next, the suggestion that inducers can immunize themselves by
getting a "rubber stamped" opinion letter is grossly overstated. At a
minimum, it suggests that lawyers would readily violate their ethical
obligations to their clients by essentially lying about their opinions on
infringement, validity, and enforceability. Admittedly, in many cases,
there are ambiguities which a lawyer could shade in favor of their
client to avoid liability, but this reality is not a reason to reject the
relevance of an opinion letter altogether. This argument also assumes
that the opinion letter would act as a complete shield to liability for
the accused inducer. If the relevance of the accused inducer's belief
is limited to past damages, however, then the risk of rubberstamping
by opinion letters is mitigated. The possibility of a permanent
injunction would act as a check on the attorney being overly
optimistic about the likelihood of defeating an infringement suit. The
50. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) ("The concept of "willful infringement" is not simply a
conduit for enhancement of damages; it is a statement that patent infringement, like other civil
wrongs, is disfavored, and intentional disregard of legal rights warrants deterrence.").
51. See Read Corp. v. Portec Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[A] finding of
willful infringement does not mandate that damages be enhanced, much less mandate treble
damages.").
2006] INTENT ELEMENT OF INDUCED INFRINGEMENT 411
client is relying on the opinion to plan its business operations and
would want an honest assessment of the risk that they may have to
shut operations down or alter them to avoid infringement.
Rader proffers a third reason to prefer the Hewlett-Packard
standard: "it limits the opportunistic behavior of would-be inducers
by giving patentees the power to compel settlement by forcing
corporate officers to face the prospect of personal liability. '52 This
argument is derivative of the two preceding points: that inducing
officers can game the system by obtaining opinion letters to shield
themselves from liability. The availability of injunctive relief to the
infringer belies this argument. There seems to be no reason to pierce
the veil if the officers in fact believe the induced activities will not be
infringing: these officers should not be viewed as culpable for
encouraging pro-competitive behavior. The Manville standard serves
to protect the interest of shareholders while affording some flexibility
to corporate officers to act reasonably, likely pursuant to an opinion
letter. 53
Professor Mark Lemley has eschewed this dichotomous view of
the intent standard and has offered an alternative, sliding-scale
approach to active inducement. In his view, "[t]he clearer the
defendant's intent to facilitate patent infringement, the less direct his
contribution need be." 54 Similarly, if the inducer is highly entangled
in the direct infringer's acts, then the requisite intent would be lower.
Professor Lemley, therefore, would make active inducement like
inequitable conduct, where the more material the undisclosed
reference is, the less need to demonstrate an intent to deceive because
intent can be inferred.55 The need for affirmative acts and some level
of intent set floors beyond which there can be no liability. 56
52. Rader, supra note 6 at 322.
53. See Lemley, supra note 25, at 244-45 (arguing for the Manville standard for corporate
officers).
54. Id. at 243.
55. See, e.g., Abbot Labs. v. Torpharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("While the intent to deceive may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances rather than by
direct evidence, the intent necessary to establish inequitable conduct is based on a sliding scale
related to materiality of the omission."); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access,
Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("The more material the omission or the
misrepresentation, the lower the level of intent required to establish inequitable conduct, and
vice versa."); see also Lemley, supra note 25, at 244 (noting comparison to inequitable
conduct).
56. Lemley, supra note 25, at 243-44.
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I agree with this approach up to a point, but still believe that a
good faith belief that the induced acts are non-infringing should
provide a safe harbor for past damages. Thus, the good faith belief
would be a threshold that would need to be overcome. If no such
belief is demonstrated, then the courts could apply the Lemley sliding
scale approach. But the safe harbor must be maintained to properly
cabin the potential breadth of the inducement doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
The intent requirement for active inducement of patent - and
now copyright - infringement is in a state of disarray. The Supreme
Court appeared to believe that the standard was fairly well-defined
and would eliminate the need to consider the availability of non-
infringing substitutes. Such hope may be - and should be - short-
lived because the intent aspect of active inducement should take into
account the belief of the inducer. A good faith belief of non-
infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability should shield inducers
from past damages, although they would still be subject to
prospective relief. This balanced approach protects not only the
patentee's interests, but also encourages pro-competitive behavior that
a broader rule would inhibit.
